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CHANGES ARE NOT ENOUGH:
PROBLEMS PERSIST WITH NCAA’S
ADJUDICATIVE POLICY
Elizabeth Lombard *
INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) identifies as “a
member-led organization dedicated to the well-being and lifelong success of
college athletes.”1 In seeking to “[p]rioritiz[e] academics, well-being and
fairness so college athletes can succeed on the field, in the classroom and for
life,” the reach of the NCAA is strong—overseeing over 1117 colleges and
universities, 100 athletic conferences, half a million college athletes, 19,750
teams, and 90 championships in twenty-four sports across three divisions.2 In
addition to the human-capital impact, the financial impact of the organization is just as startling, with the NCAA bringing in over $1 billion in annual
revenue in 2017.3 The footprint of the NCAA is massive, and understandably, with this come ebbs and flows of excessive praise and criticism from its
constituents.
Recently, the critical eye of the public has focused on the NCAA’s adjudicative and enforcement policy. The U.S. Department of Justice sparked
the spotlight in September 2017, when it revealed it was pursuing criminal
charges against collegiate basketball coaches for allegations that include
those collegiate coaches accepting bribes in return for steering their success* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; Master of Business
Administration, Notre Dame Mendoza College of Business, 2020; Bachelor of Business
Administration, University of Notre Dame, 2015. I would like to thank Professor Patricia
Bellia and Professor Elizabeth Dietz for volunteering their time, guidance, and expertise.
Thank you to the members of Notre Dame Law Review for your diligence and hard work
throughout the editing process. I would also like to thank my loving parents, fiancé,
sisters, family, and friends for always being my best advocates and encouraging me to
dream a little bigger. All errors are my own.
1 What Is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/
ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Sep. 24, 2019).
2 Id.
3 Alex Kirshner, Here’s How the NCAA Generated a Billion Dollars in 2017, SB NATION
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/2018/3/8/17092300/ncaa-revenues-financialstatement-2017.
925
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ful players toward multinational shoe companies and similar businesses.4
Journalist Alex Kirshner voiced restrained frustration with the idea that the
“NCAA gets to have a robust investigation of something it hates more than
anything else . . . . And it doesn’t even have to do the work[.]”5 Criticism
surrounding the enforcement procedures of the NCAA continued to soar, as
the NCAA announced the results of two high-profile academic-dishonesty
cases that followed shortly after this bribery scandal. The combination of the
decision that allowed the University of North Carolina (UNC) to escape
NCAA infractions after accusations of academic fraud6 and the decision,
shortly thereafter, to vacate all 2012 and 2013 football victories from the University of Notre Dame “due to academic misconduct by several student-athletes,”7 led to a storm of criticism and confusion.
Social media sites serve as a testament to the rampant shock and confusion that the general population has harbored with regard to the enforcement and adjudication process on the heels of these high-profile cases.8
Witnessing verified sports reporters and outlets refer to the NCAA as powerless or questioning its purpose or existence altogether is evidence of the
NCAA’s trying times in the court of public opinion.9 On the one hand, and
rightfully so, one might think that this disappointment stems simply from
crazed fandom—crazy Notre Dame fans just wanted their way and their wins,
or die-hard Duke fans just wanted to see UNC punished.
However, the disappointment is justified, especially when comparing the
NCAA’s adjudicative process to that of traditional administrative law. The
Commission on College Basketball recognized the gravity of the adjudicative
4 See Alex Kirshner, FAQ: What’s the FBI Actually Investigating in Its College Basketball
Corruption Probe?, SB NATION (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basket
ball/ 2018/2/25/17048132/fbi-ncaa-investigation-charges-crimes.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., Dan Kane, NCAA Faces Criticism for UNC Decision, NEWS & OBSERVER (Oct.
13, 2017), https://www.newsobserver.com/sports/college/acc/unc/article178784981
.html (“UNC-Chapel Hill escaped NCAA sanctions, in what was one of the longest-running
academic scandals in college sports history . . . . [S]ome outside of the university said the
decision showed the NCAA is failing in its stated mission of supporting the educational
opportunities for athletes.” (emphasis added)).
7 See, e.g., John I. Jenkins, A Letter from the President on the NCAA Infractions Case, UNIV.
NOTRE DAME OFF. PRESIDENT (Feb. 13, 2018), https://president.nd.edu/writings-address
es/2018-writings/a-letter-from-the-president-on-the-ncaa-infractions-case/ (“Our concerns
go beyond the particulars of our case and the record of two football seasons to the academic autonomy of our institutions, the integrity of college athletics, and the ability of the
NCAA to achieve its fundamental purpose.” (emphasis added)). Rev. John I. Jenkins is the
president of the University of Notre Dame. Id.
8 See, e.g., Dennis Dodd (@dennisdoddcbs), TWITTER (Feb. 13, 2018), https://twitter
.com/dennisdoddcbs/status/963490056886513666 (positing that “NCAA just lost Notre
Dame” and “pisse[d] off a powerful giant,” raising “questions again [about] why we need
NCAA anyway”); see also Balt. Sun Sports (@BaltSunSports), TWITTER (Oct. 14, 2017),
https://twitter.com/BaltSunSports/status/919179007991492609 (“UNC verdict shows
NCAA powerless to sanction rampant academic fraud[.]”).
9 Dodd, supra note 8; Balt. Sun Sports, supra note 8.
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process’s shortcomings when it issued its “Report and Recommendations to
Address the Issues Facing Collegiate Basketball” (the “Commission Report”)
as a response to the bribery criminal cases, federal indictments, and FBI
investigation.10 The NCAA responded with “swift action” after the report was
published.11 By early August 2018, the NCAA broadcasted its “commit[ment] to change.”12 It promised to “tak[e] action” to bring in “outside
voices,” through the use of “independent investigators and decision-makers
to enforce rules.”13 These new structures and processes promised in the
NCAA’s August 2018 commitment to change went into effect a year later.14
The NCAA has made steps in the correct direction with the changes recently
put into action. However, this Note argues that both the Commission Report
and the NCAA’s resulting commitment to change (and now-implemented
changes) do not go far enough to improve the state of the NCAA’s enforcement and adjudicative process.
Part I of this Note addresses where the status of the NCAA adjudicative
process “was”—best evidenced through the infractions hearings of the recent
headline cases at the University of North Carolina and University of Notre
Dame. Part II addresses how the NCAA’s historical adjudicative process compares with traditional administrative law processes. The third and fourth
Parts of this Note address the Commission Report and NCAA’s subsequent
response to the report, along with criticisms of both. Part V raises issues with
the adjudicative process that still linger even after these calls for change and
responses are implemented. It also addresses potential challenges to these
critiques. This Note concludes by considering more generally why this criticism matters.
I. THE OLD WAYS
The 2018–19 Division I Manual includes the NCAA’s constitution, operating bylaws, and administrative bylaws, unreflective of the NCAA’s recent
adjudicative changes.15 In order to analyze the NCAA’s historical approach to
adjudication, which sparked the public outcry, ignited the Commission
Report, and led to the NCAA’s commitment to change, this 2018–19 NCAA
Division I Manual is operative. Article 19 of the 2018–19 NCAA bylaws, analyzed below, specifically discusses the relevant “Infractions Program.”16
10 COMM’N ON COLL. BASKETBALL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE
ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 1, 39 (2018), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/
files/2018CCBReportFinal_web_20180501.pdf [hereinafter COMM’N REPORT].
11 Committed to Change, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/committed-change (last
visited Sep. 24, 2019).
12 Id. (capitalization altered); see Statement from NCAA Leaders on College Basketball
Reforms, NCAA (Aug. 8, 2018), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/
news/statement-ncaa-leaders-college-basketball-reforms.
13 Committed to Change, supra note 11 (capitalization altered).
14 Id.
15 2018–19 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL (2018), http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/D119.pdf [hereinafter 2018–19 DIVISION I MANUAL].
16 Id. § 19.
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The purpose of the NCAA’s infractions program has aligned closely with
the mission of the organization—to “uphold integrity and fair play” so that
those members who do abide by the constitution and bylaws are not “disadvantaged by their commitment to compliance.”17 The infractions program
has been committed to fair procedures and “timely resolution of infractions
cases.”18
In order to appropriately punish wrongdoers and prevent disadvantages
for those who follow the rules, the NCAA has implemented a tiered violation
structure. According to the 2018–19 bylaws, a Level I violation, a “Severe
Breach of Conduct,” is wrongdoing that “provides or is intended to provide a
substantial or extensive recruiting, competitive or other advantage, or a substantial . . . impermissible benefit.”19 Examples include lack of institutional
control, academic misconduct, “[c]ash payment[s] . . . provided by a . . .
representative of the institution’s athletics interests,” or “[f]ailure to cooperate with an NCAA enforcement investigation.”20
A step down in severity are Level II violations, “Significant Breach[es] of
Conduct,” which—plainly vague—are violations that do not rise to the level
of Level I violations, but are more serious than Level III violations.21 Perhaps
just as unclear is the description of Level II violations: wrongdoing that provides or is intended to provide “more than a minimal but less than a substantial or extensive recruiting, competitive or other advantage” to the
institution.22
A Level III violation is a “Breach of Conduct” that provides “no more
than a minimal recruiting, competitive or other advantage,” such as an
“[i]nadvertent violation[ ].”23 Ultimately, the strongest interpretative guidance that can be pulled from this three-tiered violation structure is that a
Level I violation is more severe than a Level II violation, which is more severe
than a Level III violation—with the difference in severity depending on
whether “institutional control” existed and the level of “recruiting, competitive or other advantage” the party intended to gain.24 To note that the
2018–19 bylaws, written as broadly and openly as they are, give the interpret17 Id. § 19.01.1; What Is the NCAA?, supra note 1. Note that this purpose has not
changed with the adoption of the new adjudicative process reflected in the 2019–20 Division I Manual. See 2019–20 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 19.01.1 (2019), http://www.ncaa
publications.com/productdownloads/D120.pdf [hereinafter 2019–20 DIVISION I MANUAL].
18 2018–19 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, § 19.01.1.
19 Id. § 19.1.1.
20 Id.
21 Id. § 19.1.2.
22 Id.
23 Id. § 19.1.3.
24 Id. § 19.1. Level IV violations also exist, but these infractions alone will generally
not affect intercollegiate athletic eligibility. Level IV violations include “[i]ncidental
issues” that the NCAA classifies as “inadvertent and isolated.” New Violation Structure Introduced, NCAA (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/
new-violation-structure. These infractions are “technical in nature” and provide no more
than a negligible competitive advantage to the individual or institution. As such, these
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ers of violations substantial power in the gradation determination of an
offense is not a particularly provocative claim.25
How much weight has this gradation level carried within the NCAA’s
adjudicative process? The 2018–19 bylaws list the “core penalties” associated
with each violation level.26 Level I and Level II core penalties include postseason play limitations, fines or returns of revenue, scholarship reductions,
suspension of coaches, recruiting restrictions, and probation.27 The 2018–19
bylaws allow for departure from the core penalties in cases of extenuating
circumstances, and provide a list of additional penalties those deciding may
consider—including vacation of records, individual or team, in which a student-athlete competed while ineligible.28 For Level III violations, core penalties include termination of recruitment of a prospective athlete, institutional
fines of up to $5000 (in most circumstances), reduction in the number of
financial aid awards allowed, and public reprimand.29
In determining which of the core penalties will attach to the violators,
the decisionmakers historically have been asked to consider both aggravating
and mitigating factors in their decision-making process.30 Mitigating factors,
which “warrant a lower range of penalties for a particular party,” include
prompt self-detection and disclosure, acceptance of responsibility, exemplary
cooperation with the investigation and adjudicative process, and implementation of a system of compliance to ensure compliance throughout the institution.31 On the other hand, aggravating factors such as repeat offenses,
historical lack of compliance, lack of institutional control, intentional or blatant behavior, and lack of cooperation through obstruction might warrant a
higher range of penalties for a party.32
As was the case for the decision regarding the gradation of violations,
the decision regarding type and extent of punishment is one that has historically endowed the decisionmaker with a substantial amount of power, discretion, and flexibility. Within the classes of Level I and Level II violations, the
bylaws have generally granted decisionmakers significant autonomy in deterviolations are not even discussed in the Infractions Program section of the NCAA’s operational bylaws. See 2018–19 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, § 19.1.
25 The 2019–20 Division I Manual did not make any significant changes to the gradation of violations. See 2019–20 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 17, § 19.1.
26 See 2018–19 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, § 19.9.5.
27 Id.
28 Id. §§ 19.9.6–.7.
29 Id. § 19.9.8. No significant changes were made to the penalties available to decisionmakers with the publication of the 2019–20 Division I Manual. Compare 2019–20
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 17, § 19.9, with 2018–19 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra
note 15, § 19.9.8.
30 2018–19 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, § 19.9.2.
31 Id. § 19.9.4.
32 Id. § 19.9.3. As with the available penalties at the decisionmakers’ disposal, the
aggravating and mitigating factors have not changed in the wave of the most recent
changes to the bylaws. Compare 2019–20 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 17,
§§ 19.9.3–.4, with 2018–19 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, §§ 19.9.3–.4.
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mining how to punish the noncompliance—from a one-time fine to vacating
a national championship, from restricting playoff contention to taking away a
scholarship from a 120-athlete roster. The impact of the decisions these men
and women have made in terms of gradation and corresponding punishment
have been far reaching. Regardless, the NCAA bylaws have historically
endowed decisionmakers with a substantial amount of flexibility and autonomy in these powerful, far-reaching decisions.
Who are these decisionmakers, who have traditionally been granted this
substantial power? While the adjudicative structures and policies already outlined above have remained substantially untouched by the changes effectuated by the 2019–20 Division I Manual,33 the NCAA’s commitment to change
has added new players—and ultimately an entirely new track of adjudication—when it comes to adjudicative decisionmaking. These changes are discussed in detail in Part IV of this Note, but an analysis of the previous state of
affairs, which sparked the public outcry, is crucial at the outset.34
The NCAA’s infractions program has historically been made up of three
bodies that have worked together in order to execute the NCAA’s rules and
regulations and appropriately penalize those who fall short: the Enforcement
Staff, the Committee on Infractions, and the Infractions Appeals Committee.
The Enforcement Staff has historically been solely responsible for determining whether an investigation into an alleged failure to comply with the
NCAA’s constitution and bylaws is warranted.35 The Enforcement Staff has
the duty of conducting the investigations on behalf of the entire NCAA to
gather all relevant information from the pertinent parties.36 In order to fulfill this responsibility, the Enforcement Staff has provided notices to the institution in question via the institution’s presidential office and conducted
interviews with institutional employees, directors of athletics, and studentathletes.37
Once this information gathering is complete, if the Enforcement Staff
determines that the Committee on Infractions may conclude a violation
occurred, the Committee on Infractions then takes over.38 Traditionally, the
Committee on Infractions has held hearings, in front of a subset of the group
called a hearing panel, to make factual findings related to alleged bylaw violations, conclude whether those facts constitute one or more violations, and
prescribe appropriate penalties.39 After the hearing, as a part of its delibera33 See supra notes 17, 25, 29, 32.
34 As a preliminary note, it might be important to acknowledge that each of the decision-making bodies discussed below still exist, but as discussed in Part IV, they now exist
alongside a parallel “independent” adjudication system made up of new decision-making
bodies.
35 2018–19 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, § 19.5.1.
36 Id.
37 Id. §§ 19.5.3, 19.5.6.
38 Id. § 19.7.1.
39 Id. §§ 19.3.3, 19.3.6. In cases involving Level I or Level II violations, the institutions
or individuals may elect to pursue a “Summary Disposition Process.” Id. § 19.6. For this
process to unfold, the Enforcement Staff and individuals or institutions must all agree to
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tions, the hearing committee has had the opportunity to request new information, request an interpretation from other NCAA departments, or decide
and penalize.40 The Committee on Infractions has been responsible for subsequent monitoring of compliance with any penalties it prescribes.41
The institutions then have had the opportunity to appeal a hearing
panel’s decision.42 The Appeals Committee has historically had the authority
and responsibility to consider appeals from the Committee on Infractions
involving Level I or Level II violations, and in doing so, to affirm, reverse, or
remand the panel’s findings, conclusions, or penalties.43 Institutions could
appeal prescribed penalties to the extent that the Committee on Infractions
abused its discretion.44 Additionally, institutions could appeal factual findings and conclusions to the extent a factual finding was clearly contrary to
information presented, the facts did not constitute a violation, or a procedural error led to the wrong conclusion or finding.45
The important decision-making, violation-determining, and punishment-creating Committee on Infractions has had its composition dictated by
the NCAA bylaws. The Committee on Infractions has been made up of at
most twenty-four members who have been pulled from a list of categories of
professionals: current and former college or university presidents, intercollegiate athletic directors, NCAA coaches, representatives from athletic conferences, institutional staff or faculty, athletic administrators with experience in
compliance, and general public members with legal training without athletic
or collegiate associations.46 The Appeals Committee has had only five members, including at least one member of the general public without athletic,
conference, or institutional association. The other Appeals Committee members are required to be current or former staff members from an active member institution or conference.47 For both the Committee on Infractions and
the Appeals Committee, the NCAA bylaws require members to remove themselves when a conflict of interest arises for a specific case they are hearing.48
pursue summary disposition. The Enforcement Staff and involved parties will then submit
a written report to the Committee on Infractions, including proposed findings of fact,
proposed violations, and proposed penalties. The Committee on Infractions will then
review the Enforcement Staff’s investigation and review the proposed findings of fact, violations, and penalties. It will then either accept or reject the proposals. If penalties and facts
and/or violations are accepted, summary disposition results. If findings of fact or violations are not accepted, a full hearing process will ensue. If penalties are not accepted, the
institution or individual has the option to either accept the new penalties or pursue a full
hearing process. Id.
40 Id. § 19.7.8.
41 Id. § 19.3.6(e).
42 Id. § 19.10.2.
43 Id. § 19.10. Level III violations have had a separate, but similar, process for
responding to actions. See id. § 19.11.4.
44 Id. § 19.10.1.1.
45 Id. § 19.10.1.2.
46 Id. § 19.3.1.
47 Id. § 19.4.1.
48 See id. §§ 19.3.4, 19.4.3.
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The historical structure of these two powerful committees is nothing
short of contradictory and puzzling. On the one hand, the 2018–19 bylaws
indicate that the NCAA has been aware of the importance of independence
in this adjudicative process—both in appointing a single general public
member to each committee and in requiring members to remove themselves
when conflicts arise. On the other hand, however, this commitment to independence collapses given that a majority of both of these boards has been
comprised of individuals who compete with and work in the same space as
the institutions and individuals they are evaluating, investigating, and
punishing.
The proceedings of two recent high-profile NCAA infractions cases
demonstrate how this status quo process has worked. In October 2017, the
NCAA released its press statement, and decision, with regard to allegations of
academic fraud, impermissible student-athlete benefits, and lack of institutional control or compliance procedures brought against the University of
North Carolina after an Enforcement Staff investigation.49 While the Committee on Infractions did find two violations against a department chair and a
curriculum secretary for failure to cooperate with the investigation, UNC successfully avoided violations decisions on any of the other—heftier—institutional allegations.50 Using the factual findings brought to them by the
Enforcement Staff, the Committee on Infractions found no evidence that the
benefits conveyed to the student-athletes were student-athlete specific.
Rather, the benefits garnered by the student-athletes were garnered by all
students.51 Hence, in the eyes of the Committee, there was no violation in
terms of the university’s providing an athletic benefit—recruiting, competitive, or otherwise.
Interestingly, the NCAA reveals the names and background of the members of the committee who sit on specific hearings. While the 2018–19 bylaws
note that members are drawn from a mix of those with NCAA membership
and those from the public,52 it appears in the case of UNC that only a single
member who weighed in on the institution’s decision was not affiliated with
the NCAA. The decisionmakers in this case included Greg Sankey, the
panel’s chief hearing officer and commissioner of the Southeastern Conference (SEC); Carol Cartwright, president emeritus at Kent State University
and Bowling Green State University; Alberto Gonzales, dean of the law school
at Belmont University and former U.S. Attorney General; Eleanor W. Myers,
associate professor of law emerita and former faculty athletics representative
49 Infractions Panel Could Not Conclude Academic Violations in North Carolina Case, NCAA
(Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/infractionspanel-could-not-conclude-academic-violations-north-carolina-case [hereinafter Infractions
Panel].
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See 2018–19 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, § 19.3.1. The bylaws require, to the
extent reasonably possible, that each of the abovementioned groups be represented, but
do not require, or recommend, any specific quota. Id.
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at Temple University; Joe Novak, former head football coach at Northern
Illinois University; and Jill Pilgrim, an attorney in private practice and the
member of the public in this case.53 Though a member of the public, Ms.
Pilgrim also has had extensive sports exposure throughout her career—working for USA Track and Field and the Ladies Professional Golf Association.54
She is additionally listed as an adjunct law professor for the University of
Miami in Florida.55
In August 2014, Jack Swarbrick, the University of Notre Dame’s director
of athletics, and Rev. John Jenkins, C.S.C., the university’s president, held a
press conference to announce an academic-dishonesty probe Notre Dame’s
compliance office was conducting, one that implicated some headline football player names.56 Rev. Jenkins noted that suspicions had arisen at the conclusion of the summer session that student-athletes had submitted work that
was not their own. Notre Dame then initiated a full investigation.57 It went
on to remove five student athletes from play in the 2014–15 football season as
a result of its independent investigation.58
In addition to its own investigation, “the institution notified the NCAA
enforcement staff of potential NCAA violations.”59 The Enforcement Staff
then submitted a formal records request and notice of inquiry and began its
own NCAA investigation. The Committee on Infractions found “multiple
years of academic violations by a former student athletic trainer and football
student-athletes” throughout the 2011–12 and 2012–13 football seasons.60
Notre Dame argued, and the Committee concurred, that the violations were
Level II violations. The Committee prescribed penalties of one-year of probation, a $5000 fine, a two-year show-cause order, vacation of team and individual records, and dissociation of the former student athletic trainer.61
Notre Dame appealed only the punishment of the vacation of the wins to the
Appeals Committee,62 emphasizing its “primacy . . . in addressing core academic matters” and that the university did not have knowledge or involve53 Infractions Panel, supra note 49.
54 Jill Pilgrim, PILGRIM & ASSOCIATES L. OFF., http://pilgrim-associateslaw.com/attor
neys-2/jill-pilgrim/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
55 Jill Pilgrim, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/jill-pilgrim-74a0021a (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
56 Eric Hansen, Notre Dame Response to Fraud Probe Creates More Questions than Answers, S.
BEND TRIB. (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.southbendtribune.com/sports/college/notre
dame/football/notre-dame-response-to-fraud-probe-creates-more-questions-than/article_
9cc003f6-2499-11e4-81d5-0017a43b2370.html.
57 Id.
58 NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PUBLIC INFRACTIONS DECISION 2 (2016).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1. Notre Dame’s case proceeded through the summary disposition process.
Id. For a discussion of the summary disposition process generally, see supra note 39.
61 Id. at 2.
62 See Emily James, NCAA Appeals Committee Upholds Vacation of Notre Dame Wins, NCAA
(Feb. 13, 2018), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-appealscommittee-upholds-vacation-notre-dame-wins.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL209.txt

934

unknown

Seq: 10

notre dame law review

3-JAN-20

10:19

[vol. 95:2

ment in the conduct.63 The Appeals Committee dismissed Notre Dame’s
argument and upheld the vacation of wins, noting that as a member of the
NCAA, Notre Dame must submit to NCAA rules for academic conduct and
that a student athletic trainer is considered a university employee.64
As was the case for UNC, the NCAA released the names of those who
decided the Notre Dame infractions case. Those who heard the initial case
included Greg Christopher, vice president for administration and athletics
director at Xavier University; Thomas Hill, senior policy advisor to the president of Iowa State University; Greg Sankey, chief hearing officer for the
panel, chair of the Committee on Infractions, and commissioner for the
Southeastern Conference; Larry Parkinson, director of enforcement for the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; and Sankar Suryanarayan, university
counsel at Princeton University.65 Interestingly, the member of the public in
this instance, Larry Parkinson, has significant administrative law experience
outside the context of sports.66 The members of the Appeals Committee
who heard Notre Dame’s appeal were Ellen Ferris, associate commissioner
for governance and compliance at the American Athletic Conference (AAC);
Jack Friedenthal, professor emeritus at George Washington University; W.
Anthony Jenkins, an attorney in private practice; Patti Ohlendorf, then-vice
president for legal affairs at the University of Texas; and David Williams,
Appeals Committee chair and then–vice chancellor for athletics and university affairs and athletics director at Vanderbilt University.67
Diving deeper into the individuals who played a powerful role in the
university’s fate reveals an interesting web of connections both with Notre
Dame and with one another. Notable is the presence of two conference representatives: the SEC commissioner and the AAC associate commissioner.
The University of Notre Dame, while participating in the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) for twenty-four of its twenty-six collegiate sports,68 is one of
very few schools that has refrained from joining a conference in its largest
and highest-revenue-producing sport, football.69 The fact-based connec63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Emily James, Former Notre Dame Athletic Training Student Acted Unethically, Committed
Academic Misconduct, NCAA (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/
media-center/news/former-notre-dame-athletic-training-student-acted-unethically-commit
ted-academic-misconduct.
66 Id.
67 NCAA Appeals Committee Upholds Vacation of Notre Dame Wins, supra note 62.
68 See John Heisler, Notre Dame and the Atlantic Coast Conference: A Whole New Ballgame,
UND.COM (July 1, 2013), https://und.com/notre-dame-and-the-atlantic-coast-conferencea-whole-new-ballgame/. Hockey is one of the sports for which Notre Dame does not participate in the ACC. Instead, Notre Dame hockey plays in the Big 10. See Dan Colleran,
Notre Dame Hockey Program to Join Big Ten Conference as Sport Affiliate Member, NCAA (Mar. 23,
2016), https://www.ncaa.com/news/icehockey-men/article/2016-03-23/notre-damehockey-join-big-ten-conference-sport-affiliate.
69 See, e.g., UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, HIGHER EDUCATION ACT REPORTING tbl. 10 (2018),
https://und.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/EADA_Report_2018-1.pdf. Only six
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tions—or, perhaps, conflicts—between these conference-affiliated decisionmakers and Notre Dame clearly run deep. First, Notre Dame competes
against the AAC and SEC in twenty-five of its twenty-six sports as an affiliate
member of both the ACC and Big Ten. Additionally, Notre Dame competes
directly against all conferences as it continues to hold out as a football independent. Notre Dame is often openly criticized for its staunch, persistent
resistance to conference affiliation in football.70
More interesting, however, might be one of the relationships between
decisionmakers. Mr. Williams, who was the athletic director of Vanderbilt, an
SEC institution, was charged with reviewing the decision made by the Committee of Infractions—a Committee that included SEC commissioner Greg
Sankey, the head of Vanderbilt’s conference.71
Of course, one cannot fairly question the actual integrity of the
hardworking men and women who decided this case, and they may have
indeed been independent in fact. However, quite evidently, they have extensively worked with and competed against one another and the institution that
they were evaluating. This was not a coincidence affecting only Notre Dame
or UNC, either, but rather a consequence of the intentionally designed
nature of the composition of these powerful boards. While the NCAA has
accounted for direct conflicts of interest in its bylaws, it is clear that complete
independence in adjudication, at least in appearance, has not historically
been a priority of the organization.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WAY
A comparison of the NCAA’s historical adjudicative panel composition
to that of traditional administrative law’s decision-making adjudicative bodies
enlightens this discussion.
Why might administrative adjudication be an apt comparison for NCAA
adjudication? The NCAA operates quite like a federal agency. Like administrative agencies, the NCAA is a bureaucratic organization that serves as
neither a legislature nor a court and whose leaders are not elected by the
people, while making important decisions that affect individual citizens and
the economy.72 Like most administrative agencies, the purpose of the
Division I football teams participate in the sport without a conference, including Notre
Dame. See 2018 College Football Standings: Independents (FBS), FOX SPORTS, https://www.fox
sports.com/college-football/standings?season=2018&group=15 (last visited Sept. 22,
2019).
70 Steve Spurrier, former head football coach of the University of Florida and University of South Carolina, reflected this mentality at the SEC Media Days in 2013. “For
whatever reason, all 14 [SEC] head coaches thought that Notre Dame should join the ACC
and play football like the rest of us . . . . [W]hy aren’t they in a conference[?]” Matt Smith,
Notre Dame Football: Steve Spurrier Wrong in Criticism of Irish Independence, BLEACHER REP. (July
21, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1711525-notre (first alteration in original)
(quoting Steve Spurrier).
71 See supra text accompanying notes 65 and 67.
72 See WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 12 (4th ed. 2000).
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NCAA—fostering the safety and success of collegiate athletes—is focused and
limited in scope. However, like agencies, the NCAA’s reign and discretion
within these subject-matter boundaries is broad, general, and far-reaching.73
Within their areas of expertise, agencies and the NCAA have three main
duties and authorities with regard to their decisionmaking: rulemaking, adjudication, and informal action.74 In many ways, the adjudication process of
agencies is similar to the adjudication process in the NCAA—permitting oral
hearing and examination in front of the organization’s self-appointed adjudicators, who preside solely over organization-specific matters, without the formal rules of evidence or comprehensive rules of discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.75 The two adjudicative processes diverge, however,
with the requirement of the presence of a “neutral presiding officer” in the
form of an administrative law judge (ALJ) in agency adjudication and the
historical absence of such a requirement—and in fact the requirement of the
contrary—in NCAA adjudication.76
The administrative process in the United States is governed mostly by
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Written in 1946, the Act established the adjudicative process in administrative agencies, the right for individuals to have an agency hearing, allowing all interested parties the
opportunity for “submission and consideration of facts [and] arguments,”
and notice upon decision.77 Section 3105 of the U.S. Code requires each
agency to “appoint as many administrative law judges as are necessary” for
these proceedings, so long as these judges do “not perform duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as administrative law judges.”78
The requirement that administrative adjudicators not participate in
inconsistent activities is the root of the impartial-adjudicator requirement for
decisionmakers in agency hearings. Ultimately, “provisions for the appointment of impartial, independent [h]earing [e]xaminers are the very heart
and soul of the Administrative Procedure Act.”79 Independence is mandated
both in fact and in appearance. In-fact independence is the sort of conflictof-interest prevention that has historically been addressed in the NCAA
bylaws. However, independence in appearance is more complicated. While
there might not be an “inherent reason” to “believe that [a] commissioner[ ],” for example, “necessarily act[s] with bias merely because of [her]
role within the agency, due process and its neutral adjudicator requirement
are concerned not only with actual judicial wrongdoing, but also with the
possibility or appearance of bias.”80
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
State,

See id. at 3.
See id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (2012).
Id. § 3105.
Borg-Johnson Elecs. v. Christenberry, 169 F. Supp. 746, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Martin H. Redish & Kristin McCall, Due Process, Free Expression, and the Administrative
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 297, 315 (2018).
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Thus, the question is not only whether an adjudicator (e.g., the SEC
commissioner or a former Northern Illinois football coach) had bias against
an institution (e.g., Notre Dame or UNC). The question is also whether the
“average man” assuming the simultaneous positions of adjudicator and his
outside role—conference commissioner, collegiate coach, or collegiate athletic director, for example—would be tempted “to forget the burden of proof
required,” or “not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.”81 The question
is also whether the conference commissioner or collegiate coach appeared to
have been tempted by outside influences, as perceived by a third-party
observer.
So, who are these administrative law judges who are given this substantial
grant of decision-making power? How are they selected and trained? The
selection of and requirements demanded of ALJs were recently updated
through the combination of the Supreme Court decision in Lucia v. Securities
and Exchange Commission82 and President Trump’s subsequent executive
order, effective July 10, 2018.83 Prior to the Supreme Court holding and
executive order, ALJs were selected through a process run by the Office of
Personnel Management, which included an examination and competitive
service-selection procedures.84 The Court in Lucia held that ALJs must be
selected under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.85 Under section
3(a)(ii) of the resulting executive order, ALJs are now required to hold a
professional license to practice law, with agencies prescribing additional qualification requirements as needed.86 President Trump, now charged with the
duty of selecting ALJs, recognized the “significant duties” and “significant
discretion” these ALJs have when conducting proceedings in today’s massive
and expanding administrative state.87 President Trump also recognized the
increasing importance of these decisionmakers, since they function as “the
final word of the agencies they serve.”88 Regardless of the lifting of the
requirement of the examination and competitive service-selection procedures, the appointment of an individual as an ALJ certainly remains an
honor bestowed upon legal professionals with exceptional “temperament,
legal acumen, impartiality, and sound judgment.”89
81 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
82 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
83 Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 10, 2018).
84 Id.
85 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055 (“ALJs are ‘Officers of the United States,’ subject to the
Appointments Clause.”). The Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants the
President the power to nominate, and “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,”
appoint “all other Officers of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Lucia thus
holds that ALJs must be nominated by the President and appointed through subsequent
approval of the Senate.
86 Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. at 32,755.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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The requirement of sound “temperament, legal acumen, impartiality,
and sound judgment” looms large in comparison to the historical requirements for the one outside legal personnel required to serve on the NCAA
Committee on Infractions and Appeals Committee. The 2018–19 bylaws dictate that at least one member must be pulled from “[m]embers of the general public with formal legal training who are not associated with a collegiate
institution, conference, or professional or similar sports organization and
who do not represent coaches or athletes in any capacity.”90 On the surface
and at first glance, this requirement for an individual with legal training
might seem to be the NCAA’s attempt to mimic the requirements imposed on
decisionmakers in traditional administrative law. In reality, however, the
NCAA’s historical requirement falls significantly short. The contrast between
a legally trained “[m]ember[ ] of the general public” and a Presidentappointed, law-licensed individual exhibiting “temperament, legal acumen,
impartiality, and sound judgment” is stark.91
Only at a bare minimum level does the NCAA’s token legal member
resemble a traditional ALJ. Both must have legal training, and both must
have no conflicts of interest (i.e., independent in fact). However, even if one
were to equate the requirements of the two roles, problems persist. Why
would only one member of the twenty-four be held to meet the standards that
track the requirements, at a minimum, for ALJs—judicial knowledge and
independence? Only one of twenty-four members meets the bare minimum
standard that this country has demanded in administrative law for impartial
and neutral adjudication. Notably, this individual might not even be
included in every hearing in front of the Committee.92 A hearing panel may,
therefore, align with NCAA bylaws and successfully avoid inclusion of a single
individual with an ALJ’s bare minimum requirements—judicial expertise and
independence in fact.
The NCAA bylaws, even as they stood before the commitment to change,
have shown hints of a desire for neutral adjudication—by including the category of public members with legal experience and no collegiate sports ties as
a subgroup to select from and by attempting to eliminate conflicts of interest.
However, the NCAA has historically stopped short. It stops short of independence in fact and appearance. Until it attains the independence in fact and
appearance, like that sought after through the implementation of ALJs in
traditional administrative law, the NCAA will face continual criticism in the
court of public opinion. For a public that has grown accustomed to the independence in fact and appearance in the pervasive, ever-expanding administrative state, the lack of independence, at least in appearance, of the
90 2018–19 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, § 19.3.1(g).
91 Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. at 32,755.
92 Hearing panels are made up of not less than five but not more than seven individuals pulled from the pool of twenty-four on the Committee. 2018–19 DIVISION I MANUAL,
supra note 15, § 19.3.3. A hearing panel may, therefore, align with NCAA bylaws and avoid
inclusion of any individual with the administrative law minimum requirements—judicial
expertise and independence in fact and appearance.
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adjudicators in NCAA cases will lead to nothing short of confusion, distrust,
lack of confidence, and even lack of legitimacy.
III. THE RICE COMMISSION

ON

COLLEGE BASKETBALL’S WAY

After the indictments were handed down from the Department of Justice, and in the midst of the FBI’s investigation of college basketball, the
NCAA asked the Commission on College Basketball for a report to “assess the
state of [college basketball] and to recommend transformational changes to
address multiple issues and challenges” that were present.93 The Commission, charged in April 2018 by the NCAA to identify “bold legislative, policy
and structural modifications,” was led by Dr. Condoleezza Rice.94 The Commission was made up of thirteen other members, including the University of
Notre Dame’s president, the chairman of USA Basketball, various athletic
directors, the owner and vice chairman of a National Basketball Association
franchise, and the current president of the NCAA, Mark Emmert.95 These
accomplished, bright, sports-minded individuals set out on an important
task—one they recognized was needed.
The Commission noted the state of college basketball was “deeply troubled,”recognizing levels of corruption and deceit so high that they
“threaten[ed] the very survival” of college basketball altogether.96 The Commission, in providing its lengthy and thorough list of recommendations,
attempted to realign the NCAA and college basketball around its central mission: the commitment to the college degree for and education of the studentathlete.97 In order to recenter and refocus the organization in the midst of
dangerous levels of corruption and deceit, the NCAA asked the Commission
to focus on three areas: (1) the relationships between the NCAA, its members, their student-athletes and coaches, and third parties; (2) the relationship between the NCAA and the NBA; and (3) the creation of the “right
relationship” between the NCAA and its member institutions “to promote
transparency and accountability.”98
The recommendations to the NCAA, which revolved around these areas
of improvement, were broken up into four sections in the Commission’s
report. The changes enveloped in section 1 were dedicated to providing
“[r]ealistic [p]athways” to success by (1) eliminating the one-and-done track
that allows college athletes to pursue NBA play after just one year of college
93 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 10, at 1.
94 Commission on College Basketball Charter, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/governance/
commission-college-basketball-charter (last visited Nov. 23, 2019). Dr. Rice previously
served both as sixty-sixth U.S. Secretary of State and as provost of Stanford University. Id.
95 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 10, at 15–16.
96 Id. at 1.
97 Id. at 2. The Commission noted that an important metric for a collegiate sport’s
success is its graduation rate. College Basketball’s rate lagged significantly behind that of
other sports, with the Department of Education estimating that less than one-half of college basketball student-athletes graduated in 2017. Id. at 2 & n.1.
98 Id. at 15.
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play; (2) allowing student-athletes to test their professional prospects without
losing amateur status; (3) allowing student-athletes to access professional
agents’ advice at an earlier time; and (4) standardizing degree completion
programs and funding the completion of degrees for students who pursue
profession sports before graduating.99 The changes recommended in section 2 revolved around neutral investigation and adjudication of “[s]erious
[i]nfractions” and seek to increase responsibility and accountability of both
institutions and individuals.100 Section 3 discussed ways to mitigate nonscholastic, harmful influences on college basketball by (1) increasing transparency of finances; (2) enlisting apparel companies to join in on the
transparency and accountability; (3) establishing youth NCAA programs; and
(4) adopting rule changes around the college recruiting process.101 Section
4 suggested the NCAA incorporate a “[s]ignificant [c]adre” of public members to the NCAA’s Board of Governors, breaking up the current dominance
of institutional presidents or chancellors.102
Immediately evident in the report is the Commission’s recognition of
the rampant problem of the lack of independence throughout the NCAA.
Both section 2 and section 4, half of the recommendations, are dedicated to
removing and replacing individuals who have “skin in the game” from important decision-making roles. In the same way President Trump pledged
throughout his campaign to “drain the swamp” in D.C.,103 it appears the
Commission on College Basketball is attempting to “drain the swamp” in
Indianapolis—at the NCAA’s headquarters. Section 2 focuses on neutral
decisionmaking in the context of the adjudicative and enforcement arm of
the NCAA, while section 4 seems to go a step further and asks for independence in the NCAA’s highest governance body, the Board of Governors.
While the recommendations included in section 2 are most relevant to a
critique of the adjudicative processes of the NCAA, it is worth discussing
briefly the section 4 recommendations. The Commission recommended the
NCAA restructure its Board to mirror the makeup of a public company or,
perhaps more appropriately, an established nonprofit company, by incorporating outside board members to “provide objectivity, relevant experience,
perspective and wisdom” in their decision-making roles throughout the
organization.104 The Commission was so serious and committed to the need
for independence at the top of the organization that it asked for the NCAA’s
“prompt[ ]” identification of eligible candidates and even volunteered the
Commission’s continued assistance in assembling “a first-rate list of candi99 Id. at 3–9, 29–38.
100 Id. at 9–11, 38–44. The changes recommended in this section are most relevant to
this Note’s analysis and will be discussed in more detail below.
101 Id. at 11–12, 44–50.
102 Id. at 14, 51.
103 See Brett Samuels, Trump: ‘It May Not Look Like It, but We Are Draining the Swamp,’
HILL (Apr. 12, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/382883-trump-itmay-not-look-like-it-but-we-are-draining-the-swamp.
104 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 10, at 14.
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dates.”105 The Commission on College Basketball is evidently committed to
independent leadership and decisionmaking in a way the NCAA has historically shied away from.
The Commission’s recognition of the value of independence in
“provid[ing] objectivity, relevant experience, perspective, and wisdom” did
not stop at the top.106 In section 2, it recommended “draining the swamp” in
the adjudicative arm of the NCAA as well. A deep dive into these recommendations is necessary.
First, the Commission recognized a need for “prompt radical transformation” in the way the NCAA investigates and enforces its rule violations and
infractions.107 The Commission was cognizant that the current view of the
NCAA and collegiate athletics, in the court of public opinion, is that the
system is a “broken” one.108 The Commission recognized a tension—that
decisionmakers in these infractions cases “are volunteers and NCAA members” who “face perceived conflicts of interest in adjudicating . . . with
adverse consequences for the credibility of the process.”109 This promise for
independence does appear “radical,” and necessary, on its face.
Almost immediately, however, this “radical” change was reined in and
limited. The Commission recommended that all infractions cases be divided
into two categories—(1) cases involving “complex or serious violations,” a
class of cases they referred to throughout the report as “complex cases,” and
(2) “all others.”110 For all “complex cases,” the Commission recommended
that the NCAA go back to the drawing board and start from scratch,
“creat[ing] an entirely new process for investigating and deciding.”111 It further recommended the infusion of “paid, independent decision makers, such
as lawyers, arbitrators and retired judges” to replace the current panel of
volunteers and NCAA members.112 For “all others,” however, the current
system—the one the Commission deemed “broken” and in need of “prompt
radical transformation”—will stand.113
Given that the Commission deemed only one branch of cases deserving
of independence and its resulting “objectivity, relevant experience, perspective and wisdom,”114 one might assume that careful detail was provided
regarding how exactly and who exactly will make the determination of who is
worthy. One would hope serious thought and time were devoted and will be
devoted toward the determination of which cases are complex and which are
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 38.
108 Id. at 39. For a reflection of the current public opinion revolving around the
NCAA, see supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text.
109 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 10, at 39.
110 Id. at 38–39.
111 Id. at 39.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 38–39. For a thorough evaluation and criticism of the historical system of
adjudication, see supra Parts I–II.
114 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 10, at 14.
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not. Unfortunately, clarity was absent. The Commission, somewhat in passing and quite vaguely, described complex cases as cases where “large sums of
money and serious reputational damage is at stake.”115 The Commission
provided no other identifying characteristics of complex cases. It did recognize it left open the complex classification as a pending “threshold question”
for the NCAA—suggesting that potentially either the NCAA, the institutions,
or both could have the power to deem cases complex, while also suggesting
the NCAA has the final word on whether the classification is appropriate.116
The Commission continued by describing further suggestions for the
newly constructed adjudicative body—but notably, still only to be implemented in the course of hearing “complex” cases, while the other cases are
stuck with the old way. The Commission recommended that the NCAA have
the new independent decisionmakers form a pool from which three random
adjudicators would be called upon at the commencement of each infractions
case.117 The panel would operate under the rules of the American Arbitration Association, making decisions of the panel “final and binding, subject to
review only under the Federal Arbitration Act.”118
Ultimately, the Commission recognized that it is time. It even recognized that “[i]t is time for independent adjudication”—but, for some reason,
it only recognized this for certain cases: the “NCAA’s complex cases.”119
IV. THE NEW NCAA WAY
In the aftermath of the high-profile and highly criticized Notre Dame
and UNC infractions cases, the Department of Justice indictments, the FBI
investigation, and the “radical” requests from the Commission on College
Basketball, the public was left with numerous questions and anxiously
awaited the NCAA’s answers.
The Division I Council met in mid-June 2018 to develop legislation in
response to the Commission’s presentation of recommendations to the
Board of Governors, a short month and a half prior.120 In August 2018, the
Council presented the legislation to the Division I Board, which culminated
with the Division I Board’s approval and its taking action on the legislation.121 The Division I Board of Directors came out with a message that it
was “committed to change”—taking action in three broad, important
areas.122 First, it announced it was committed to changes in basketball in
allowing for greater “freedom and flexibility” revolving around “going pro”
and even paying for scholarships for those who come back to finish their
degrees later, while working to minimize the power and leverage of “harmful
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 39.
Id. at 39 n.28.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
Committed to Change, supra note 11.
Id.
Id. (capitalization altered).
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outside influences.”123 Second, it announced it would act to increase
accountability through a more efficient investigations and infractions process
and by setting stronger penalties for individuals and institutions.124 Lastly,
and most relevant to the discussion here, the NCAA looked to embrace
“outside voices” by bringing in “independent investigators and decision-makers to enforce rules” and by adding “public voices to the NCAA Board of
Governors.”125 This third arm of the commitment to change, a commitment
proudly brandished on the NCAA’s website, seemed to track closely with section 2 of the Commission report discussed in detail above—but a deeper dive
into the details of bylaw changes proposed and eventually enacted is necessary before true comparisons and contrasts can be drawn. The NCAA’s
broadcasted commitment to change was finalized and formalized in August
2019, when the NCAA reflected these changes in its 2019–20 Division I Manual and corresponding 2019–20 bylaws.
In a bolded title on its website, the NCAA promised to provide
“[i]ndependent investigators and decision-makers” through legislative
change.”126 But how? The NCAA’s answer is its “Independent Accountability Resolution,” formalized in article 19.11 of its 2019–20 bylaws.127 The
NCAA’s solution is adding more players to its adjudication game. In an
attempt to “prevent conflicts of interest,”128 the NCAA mirrors the two-track
system of infractions suggested by the Commission on College Basketball.
Complex cases, and only complex cases, are eligible for its new, “independent
process.”129 The others are left with the old, historical—and rightfully,
highly criticized130—adjudicative system. As such, the “old way” of adjudication discussed in detail in Part I of this Note still coexists alongside this Independent Accountability Resolution track.
The NCAA has deployed new groups to help implement its version of
“independent” adjudication, including the Independent Accountability
Oversight Committee,131 the Infractions Referral Committee,132 the Complex Case Unit,133 and the Independent Resolution Panel.134 Each group
plays a unique role.
The Independent Accountability Oversight Committee, made up of
three public members of the NCAA Board of Governors and the chair and
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. (capitalization altered).
126 Independent Investigators and Decision-makers, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
independent-investigators-and-decision-makers (last updated Oct. 31, 2018). These committed changes went into effect August 1, 2019. Id.
127 2019–20 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 17, § 19.11.
128 Independent Investigators and Decision-makers, supra note 126.
129 Id.
130 See supra Parts I–II.
131 See 2019–20 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 17, § 19.11.2.1.
132 See id. § 19.11.2.2.
133 See id. § 19.11.2.4.
134 See id. § 19.11.2.3.
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vice chair of the Division I Board of Directors,135 is charged with general
oversight of the independent enforcement and infractions processes, nominating individuals to the other new groups, and devising new policies and
procedures as an ongoing improvement mechanism.136
The Infractions Referral Committee reviews and makes decisions on
requests made from eligible parties for their case to be deemed complex.
Accordingly, a case is not automatically considered complex after a request is
made by the institution, athlete, or NCAA, but rather the case must first pass
the muster of the Infractions Referral Committee.137 Similar to the suggestion made by the Commission, the NCAA has embraced a model where multiple parties have the opportunity to request that a case be considered
complex.138 It is the duty of the Infractions Referral Committee to make the
ultimate decision regarding complexity.139 On its website, the NCAA provides some examples of what types of cases will likely be deemed complex
cases including “alleged violations of core NCAA values, such as prioritizing
academics and the well-being of student-athletes; the possibility of major penalties; or adversarial behavior.”140 The 2019–20 bylaws build on these examples by contributing a few additional factors for consideration in the referral
determination and also provide a guiding principle—for the committee to
refer cases when the NCAA’s best interests are served by resolving the case
independently.141 The bylaws circularly call for the committee to refer to
“independent” adjudication when “independent” adjudication seems necessary.142 This referral decision is “final, binding and conclusive, and not subject to further review”—meaning a case deemed noncomplex is stuck with
the traditional nonindependent adjudication track once the Infractions
Referral Committee decides it should be so.143 Notably, the Infractions
Referral Committee, which ultimately holds the burden of deciding whether
a case is deserving of independence, is itself not fully independent. The
Committee has five members, only one of whom is an independent member
of the Independent Resolution Panel, with the rest all being members of
various Division I committees.144
Once the Infractions Referral Committee deems a case complex, the
case is referred over to the Complex Case Unit.145 The Complex Case Unit
serves as the investigation unit of the new system—made up of external investigators with no institutional affiliations along with NCAA-associated Enforce135 Id. § 19.11.2.1.1.
136 Id. § 19.11.2.1.5.
137 See id. § 19.11.2.2.5; Independent Investigators and Decision-makers, supra note 126.
138 See 2019–20 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 17, § 19.11.3.2.1.
139 Id. § 19.11.3.2.4.2.
140 Independent Investigators and Decision-makers, supra note 126.
141 See 2019–20 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 17, § 19.11.3.1.
142 Id.
143 Id. § 19.11.3.2.4.2.
144 See id. § 19.11.2.2.1; Independent Investigators and Decision-makers, supra note 126.
145 2019–20 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 17, § 19.11.2.4.3.
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ment Staff.146 The Complex Case Unit determines if more facts surrounding
the case are needed and, if so, conducts the investigation.147
Finally, once a case has been deemed complex and the factual investigation is complete, the Independent Resolution Panel takes over.148 The Independent Resolution Panel will have fifteen members—all “with legal, higher
education and/or sport backgrounds who are not staff members at an NCAA
member institution or conference.”149 This group will be charged with overseeing the case and deciding on appropriate penalties.150
The NCAA broadcasted its self-proclaimed commitment to change. It
formalized this change—in part, through an incorporation of independent,
or outside, voices into the important decision-making roles throughout the
organization. This incorporation of outside voices, however, is not a total
infiltration. Certain cases are deemed unworthy of the benefits of
these outside voices, by a group of predominately nonindependent
decisionmakers.
V. PROBLEMS PERSIST
The NCAA’s solution to its adjudicative crisis became effective August 1,
2019.151 An analysis of the problems that persist temper enthusiasm around
this official unveiling of an “independent” system of adjudication. The first
problem that presents itself with the NCAA’s—and therefore also the Commission on College Basketball’s—plan for improvement is the idea that only
certain cases are deserving of independent judgment.
A recognition and an analysis of the consistent incorporation of independent adjudication in traditional administrative law reflects the importance of independence in fact and appearance.152 The concept that
adjudicators must not perform acts “inconsistent” with their roles is central to
administrative law adjudication.153 Found originally in the APA and consistently accounted for even in the most recent executive order by President
Trump, independence is a priority.154 While the NCAA is in many ways parallel to an administrative body,155 it historically has—and now continues to—
diverged from administrative law in this respect, in refusing to commit to topto-bottom independence in fact and appearance for its adjudicators and
adjudicative process. Public companies are required to have outside inter146 Id. § 19.11.2.4.1.
147 Id. § 19.11.2.4.3.
148 Id. § 19.11.2.3.5.
149 Id. § 19.11.2.3.1.
150 Id. § 19.11.2.3.5.
151 See 2019–20 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 17, § 19.11; NCAA Unveils Independent
Investigation Unit, NBC SPORTS (Aug. 1, 2019), https://collegebasketball.nbcsports.com/
2019/08/01/ncaa-unveils-independent-investigation-unit/.
152 See supra Part II.
153 See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
154 See supra notes 77–89 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
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vention,156 ALJs are required to be outsiders, and yet, the NCAA is consistent
in its belief that not all cases are worthy of independence—independence
that so many other bodies have demanded.
Even the Commission on College Basketball itself, notably led in part by
the NCAA’s president, Mark Emmert, explicitly recognizes the crucial role
independence plays in the adjudicative process—noting outside members
bring “objectivity, relevant experience, perspective and wisdom.”157 The
NCAA, itself, on its “committed to change” homepage, notes independence
for investigators and decisionmakers is necessary to prevent dangerous conflicts of interest.158 Yet both the Commission on College Basketball and the
NCAA, after recognizing the powerful role independence plays in adjudication and decisionmaking more generally, refuse to commit wholeheartedly to
such independence. For whatever reason, only “[c]ases deemed complex
[are] eligible for [the] independent process”159—therefore, only cases
deemed complex are worthy of “objectivity, relevant experience, perspective
and wisdom.”160 Only cases deemed complex are worthy of a process devoid
of “conflicts of interest.”161 Imagine if the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, or the Social Security Administration
decided today, after years of explicitly preaching the value of independence,
that only certain individuals and certain institutions were deserving of this
independence in hearings. The certain outrage that would ensue in
response to this hypothetical inequity around these administrative bodies
should also be garnered toward the actual processes and structures the NCAA
has recently enacted.
One potential response to the critique of this dual-path compartmentalization that the NCAA has enacted might be an argument for efficiency: that
speed in adjudication should be prioritized over the values of independence—“objectivity, relevant experience, perspective and wisdom”162—in
cases that are, for one reason or another, not “complex” enough. Even if one
were to assume that speed or efficiency has more value than independence in
certain cases, the argument’s premise is flawed.
Both the Commission on College Basketball and the NCAA voiced
efficency concerns when planning the overhaul of the NCAA’s “broken” system of deceit and corruption. The Commission recognized that the process
of adjudication in many cases took “years” and punishment would not be
enacted until “long after the departure of [the] bad actors” from the respon156 For a review of independence requirements for board members of public companies, see Independence Requirements for Board Members, MORRISON & FOERSTER (Apr. 6, 2004),
https://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/independence-requirements-for-boardmembers.html.
157 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 10, at 14–15.
158 Committed to Change, supra note 11 (capitalization altered).
159 Independent Investigators and Decision-makers, supra note 126.
160 See COMM’N REPORT, supra note 10, at 14.
161 See Independent Investigators and Decision-makers, supra note 126.
162 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 10, at 14.
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sible institutions.163 It also recognized the public’s view of the process as
“too slow.”164 The NCAA explicitly sought to address the concern for expedited adjudicative processes, stating that its new rules provide “[m]ore efficient infractions resolutions.”165 The historical lack of efficiency in the
adjudicative process is easily reflected in both the Notre Dame and UNC
infractions cases.166
Efficiency is undoubtedly a problem, but the dual-path compartmentalization of complex cases and everything else is not the solution, because the
premise—that the compartmentalization would increase efficiency—is
unsound. On the contrary, such compartmentalization would likely decrease
efficiency. Under the new system, a new speed bump will be added to the
already bumpy process—the classification of cases as complex or not by the
Infractions Referral Committee. The process will include the waiting time—
both for the eligible parties to make their petition for their case to be considered for classification, and for the Infractions Referral Committee to make its
decision. Despite the NCAA’s and Commission on College Basketball’s commitments to increasing accountability by decreasing the time between infraction and decision, they are somehow still willing to add time for this
classification process to unfold. Even if having some cases decided by nonindependent, inside voices saves time or money as compared to the indepen163 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 10, at 39.
164 Id. The Commission went on to recommend two procedural avenues to increase
efficiency in response to these concerns: (1) a process for preliminary injunctive relief; and
(2) a time limit for submissions and decisions of infractions cases, akin to a statute of
limitations. Id. at 39–40.
165 More Efficient, Binding Enforcement System, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/moreefficient-binding-enforcement-system (last updated Aug. 8, 2018).
166 The University of Notre Dame’s adjudicative process concluded with a decision
from the Infractions Appeals Committee on February 13, 2018. See NCAA Appeals Committee
Upholds Vacation of Notre Dame Wins, supra note 62. Notre Dame originally announced its
knowledge of the potential infraction during a press conference on August 15, 2014. See
Video: Notre Dame Announces Academic Investigation, S. BEND TRIB. (Aug. 15, 2014), https://
www.southbendtribune.com/multimedia/videos/video-notre-dame-announces-academicinvestigation/video_a5bec25e-24d9-11e4-810d-001a4bcf6878.html. Therefore, Notre
Dame’s case took three years, five months, and twenty-nine days to resolve, with most of the
involved students having graduated before the hearing concluded. Two of the involved
students returned to complete their degree years later, while playing professional football.
See Chris Roling, KeiVarae Russell Finished Degree at Notre Dame During Bengals OTAs, USA
TODAY (July 7, 2018), https://bengalswire.usatoday.com/2018/07/07/keivarae-russelldegree-notre-dame-bengals-otas/; Ralph Vacchiano, Brooklyn Native Ishaq Williams Signs
Contract with Giants to Complete Comeback Story, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 7, 2016), https://www
.nydailynews.com/sports/football/giants/vacchiano-ishaq-williams-signs-giants-completecomeback-article-1.2628938. For the University of North Carolina, the institution received
its first notice of allegations in May 2015. See Andrew Carter, Why NCAA Report on UNC
Academic Case Was Not Released on Oct. 6, NEWS OBSERVER (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.newsobserver.com/sports/college/acc/unc/unc-now/article177205461.html. The Committee
on Infractions did not complete its decision until October 13, 2017—two years and five
months later—without any appeal process involved. See Infractions Panel, supra note 49.
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dent, outside voice prong of the process,167 any gains in that arm of the
process will likely be negated by the losses in efficiency due to this new classification process. The argument for dual-path compartmentalization in the
NCAA’s adjudicative process in the name of efficiency is, therefore, a mistaken one. A new speed bump is simply not the answer, especially when the
problem is a lack of speed.
Even if one were to accept the NCAA’s dual-path compartmentalization
as the appropriate mechanism for independent adjudication, a problem still
persists with regard to the procedural process of how those worthy of the
independence—“complex” cases—are selected. The NCAA has allowed institutions to self-report their cases as “complex.” The process, wisely, allows
institutions to play a role in opting into a conflict-of-interest-free, independent adjudicative process. But, arguably, that is where the wisdom of the
process stops.
A request for an independent adjudicative process does not automatically result in approval of an independent adjudicative process. The institutions must first pass through nonindependent, internally run, conflict-ofinterest-infested gates before they enter into the world of independence and
objectivity.
The request for classification as complex must be approved, first, by the
Infractions Referral Committee.168 It is worth reemphasizing the makeup of
this decision-making body that holds the important power of flipping the
switch from conflict-of-interest decisionmaking into objective decisionmaking. The Infractions Referral Committee has five members. One of these
members comes from the Independent Resolution Panel169—and thus is a
“member[ ] with legal, higher education and/or sport background[ ] who
[is] not [a] staff member[ ] at an NCAA member intuition or conference.”170 This is a great start, but it is not enough. The remaining four
members of this important decision-making body are one Division I Committee on Infractions member, one Division I Infractions Appeals Committee
member, and the Division I Council chair and vice chair.171 All four of these
members are thus internal NCAA members.172
One-fifth. Only one-fifth of this body is independent and objective. Only
one-fifth is equipped with the desirable “objectivity, relevant experience, perspective and wisdom” of which the Commission on College Basketball
preached. Only one-fifth is free of “conflicts of interest” of which the NCAA
noted it was concerned. The single outside, independent voice is surely
silenced here by the internal, conflicted voice of the majority—or
167 Neither the Commission nor the NCAA has offered evidence to prove or argue this
point.
168 Independent Investigators and Decision-makers, supra note 126.
169 2019–20 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 17, § 19.11.2.2.1.
170 Id. § 19.11.2.3.1.
171 Id. § 19.11.2.2.1.
172 For a description of the makeup of the Committee on Infractions and the Infractions Appeal Committee, see supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
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supermajority, at eighty percent. If the opinion of the weak outside arm of
this group were to diverge from the opinion of the internal arm, the internal
arm will win decidedly, every time.
There is something undoubtedly contradictory about the NCAA recognizing the cruciality and importance of an objective voice—spending time,
energy, and money constructing that objective voice—but then spending
time, energy, and money restricting access to that objective voice by making a
predominantly nonindependent, internally voiced body the all-powerful gatekeeper to this promised land.
However, even if one were to accept the five-member Infraction Referral
Committee as the appropriate decisionmaker in regard to the complex versus noncomplex decisions, concern over how it will come to this conclusion
still abounds. The guidance provided by both the Commission on College
Basketball and the NCAA with regard to qualifications for this “complex”
classification was slim. The Commission implied that complex cases are
those with “large sums of money and serious reputational damage [ ] at
stake.”173 It identified the question of complexity as a “threshold question”—and potentially suggested some cases should be designated, by nature
of the potential penalty, as “complex as a matter of rule.”174
Unfortunately, the NCAA did not provide much more clarity surrounding the “complex” distinction in its plans for revamping the adjudicative process. The NCAA provided some examples of complex cases: “alleged
violations of core NCAA values, such as prioritizing academics and the wellbeing of student athletes; the possibility of major penalties; or adversarial
behavior.”175 These “examples,” unfortunately, are neither clear-cut nor
instructive. The NCAA has seven core values.176 Determining whether an
institution’s alleged infraction violates the core value of the “highest levels of
integrity and sportsmanship” or threatens the core value of “[p]residential
leadership of intercollegiate athletics at the campus, conference and national
levels” is not a black-and-white matter but instead a subjective question of
degree.177 The possibility of “major” punishments is another question of
degree. Is a $1000, $10,000, or $100,000 penalty “major”? Is one win, a season of wins, or the “death penalty”178 “major”? The description of “adver173 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 10, at 39.
174 Id. at 39 n.28.
175 Independent Investigators and Decision-makers, supra note 126.
176 The NCAA’s seven core values are (1) the collegiate model of athletics, (2) the
highest levels of integrity and sportsmanship, (3) the pursuit of excellence in both academics and athletics, (4) the supporting role that intercollegiate athletics plays, (5) an inclusive
culture, (6) respect, and (7) presidential leadership. NCAA Core Values, NCAA, https://
web.archive.org/web/20181207085920/http://www.ncaa.org/about/ncaa-core-values
(last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
177 See id.
178 Institutions may receive repeater-violation penalties, also known as the NCAA’s version of the “death penalty,” for major violations in certain circumstances. See Enforcement
Process: Penalties, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/enforcement-process-penalties (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).
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sarial” nature does not draw any clearer lines for the interpreter. Lastly, the
NCAA neglected to adopt the suggestion from the Commission on College
Basketball to allow for certain cases to be complex as a matter of rule. The
formalization of the “Standard for Referral” and “Referral Factors” within the
2019–20 Division I Manual do little more, if anything, to enlighten.179 The
NCAA rejected the suggestion for automatic categorization that would have
eliminated at least some of the subjectivity of the compartmentalization
process.
Finally, the dual-path compartmentalization may lead to a distorted system that unfairly separates the “haves” from the “have-nots.” Institutions that
have excess resources at their disposal will be able to fight for their spots in
the complex, independent arm of the process, but institutions endowed with
less resources or a stricter budget will be forced to give up the fight and
proceed with less process and a lack of independence. Not only is this separation of the “have” institutions from the “have-not” institutions troublesome
on the surface, but it is especially troublesome when considering the impact
the division will have on precedent. Summary disposition and nonlitigated
cases carry the same precedential weight as cases in which parties fully contest and argue the charges against them, such as the UNCs and Notre Dames
of the world.180 Unless the NCAA changes its process to recognize some
level of precedential value—perhaps “noncomplex” or nonindependently
decided case decisions should be entitled to less weight—problems persist.
Poorly argued and nonindependently decided cases will bleed into the independent arm of the adjudicative process through the power of precedent.
Not only is the dual-path compartmentalization operated primarily by a
nonobjective, internally voiced group of individuals, but the underlying process of determination itself is subjective. The power of deciding whether an
individual is worthy of independent decisionmaking—and the “objectivity,
relevant experience, perspective and wisdom” that results—is a subjective
decision held in the hands of subjective decisionmakers. The inability to
appeal these all-important decisions is chilling as well. Problems undoubtedly persist.
CONCLUSION: WHY IT ALL MATTERS
The NCAA identifies itself as “a member-led organization dedicated to
the well-being and lifelong success of college athletes.”181 One way the
NCAA has recently shown its commitment to the well-being and lifelong success of college athletes is through its renewed “commit[ment] to change”
179 2019–20 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 17, § 19.11.3.1.
180 The 2019–20 Division I Manual does not give any indication that the cases decided
by the summary disposition are given any less weight in terms of precedent. In fact, the
only cases flagged within the Manual as having less precedential value are those with a
“negotiated resolution,” which are given no precedential value. See id. § 19.5.12.4.
181 What Is the NCAA?, supra note 1.
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through the incorporation of “outside voices” in the adjudicative process.182
Unfortunately, however, the commitment is only half-hearted.
The reasonable follow-up question to this analysis might be: Why does this
all matter? Why does independence matter—is it not just sports or just a
game after all? While the general public might easily deem questions
presented in front of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal
Trade Commission, or the Social Security Administration as high stakes, the
argument for why collegiate sports should be treated with the same level of
seriousness and be granted the same level of independence and objectivity
might not be as commonly or easily understood.
The NCAA is about more than sports. What is at stake in NCAA adjudications is more than win-loss records or eligibility for rivalry weekend; more
than a sliver of a loss to a coach’s multimillion-dollar salary or from the millionth dollar an institution brings in from football weekends. What is at stake
is young athletes’ livelihoods.
As the Commission on College Basketball recognized, collegiate sports
present unparalleled opportunities for young people. “We know . . . that
many young men [and women] who would otherwise have little chance of
attending college are able to take advantage of their talents to achieve something of great value in our society and economy—a college degree”—
through the gift of collegiate sports and the NCAA.183 The degrees studentathletes receive from some of the best institutions in the world are often
made possible only through the scholarships afforded to them through member institutions. With the estimated lifetime benefit of a baccalaureate
degree approaching nearly $1 million,184 the Commission on College Basketball is not exaggerative in concluding that the effects of these degrees trickle
down for generations.185 While in some ways a scholarship taken away from
a football powerhouse as a penalty from an NCAA adjudicative process might
seem like nothing,186 that is one fewer individual who gets to “achieve something of great value in our society and economy” by earning a college degree.
The NCAA recognizes in its mission statement that its decisions should
revolve around the betterment of its students,187 and therefore of its institu182 Committed to Change, supra note 11.
183 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 10, at 1.
184 Id. at 8 & n.11 (first citing ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE ET AL., GEORGETOWN UNIV. CTR.
ON EDUC. AND THE WORKFORCE, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF COLLEGE MAJORS 5 fig. 3 (2015);
and then citing The Rising Cost of Not Going to College, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 11, 2014), https:/
/www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/02/11/the-rising-cost-of-not-going-to-college/); cf. Jay
Weiner & Steve Berkowitz, USA TODAY Analysis Finds $120k Value in Men’s Basketball Scholarship, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2011), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/mens
basketball/2011-03-29-scholarship-worth-final-four_N.htm (estimating the annual value of
a typical basketball scholarship at $120,000 annually, when accounting for “goods, services
and future earnings”).
185 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 10, at 1.
186 Or even might be exciting if the penalty comes down on your school’s biggest rival.
187 See What Is the NCAA?, supra note 1.
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tions that educate them. However, in its rapid response to recent outrage
around the corruption and deceit that is preventing the accomplishment of
its mission, the NCAA falls short and hence, unfortunately, problems persist.

